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ABSTRACT 
On the Profitability of Collusion in Location Games  
by Steffen Huck, Vicki Knoblauch and Wieland Müller* 
In this note we take a first step towards the analysis of collusion in markets with spatial 
competition, focusing on the case of pure location choices. We find that collusion can 
only be profitable if a coalition contains more than half of all players. This result holds 
for location games played in k-dimensional Euclidean space as long as consumers are 
distributed via atomless density functions. For competition on the unit interval, unit 
circle, and unit square we also derive sufficient conditions for collusion to be profitable. 
 
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Zur Profitabilität von Kollusion in Standortspielen  
Wir untersuchen Kollusion in Märkten, in denen die einzige strategische Variable der 
Akteure ihre Ortswahl ist. Für Spiele in k-dimensionalen Euklidischen Räumen mit 
massepunktfreien Verteilungen zeigen wir, dass Kollusion nur profitabel sein kann, 
wenn wenigstens die Hälfte aller Akteure kolludieren. Für Wettbewerb auf dem 
Einheitsintervall, dem Einheitskreis und dem Einheitsquadrat etablieren wir 
hinreichende Bedingungen für die Profitabilität von Kollusion. 
                                                 
*  We are indebted to Kai Konrad and an anonymous referee for many helpful comments.  
1 Introduction
While the economics literature has paid considerable attention to collusion in Bertrand and Cournot
markets, collusion with di¤erent sorts of competition has been largely neglected. In this note we
take a …rst step towards the analysis of collusion in pure location games as introduced by Hotelling
(1929). Such models capture competition in many important industries where price competition is
not feasible, for example, because of regulation (as in the case of pharmacies) or vertical restraints
(as in the case of book sellers).1
Our results are based on an approach that relies on rather weak rationality requirements.
In particular, we do not solve the non-cooperative game in which some of the players can reach
binding agreements. Instead, we simply require that players will only decide to collude if they can
guarantee themselves a payo¤ better than the payo¤ expected “behind the veil of ignorance”. The
reason for this approach is simple: it is as we will see extremely di¢cult to …nd Nash equilibria for
location games with collusion. We argue that in the absence of reliable non-cooperative solutions
players should be conservative and only collude if they know for sure that this will be pro…table.
Accordingly, our de…nition of pro…tability relies on a maxmin approach. Nevertheless, we include
one section on Nash equilibrium where we show that in some cases the non-cooperative solution
coincides with ours.
For linear and circular cities with a uniform distribution of consumers we …nd that collusion
is pro…table if and only if more than half of the players collude. Part of this result can be generalized
to location games in multi-dimensional spaces with arbitrary density functions: As long as the
distribution of consumers is atomless, collusion can only be pro…table if more than half of all …rms
cooperate. For competition on the unit interval, unit circle, and unit square we are also able to
derive su¢cient conditions for collusion to be pro…table. These results are of considerable relevance
for the topic of merger in markets with limited price competition.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the general setup
and notation. Section 3 deals with the simplest one-dimensional cases, i.e., with linear and circular
cities with uniform consumer densities. Section 4 deals with the general multi–dimensional case
and establishes the main theorem of the paper. Section 5 adds su¢cient conditions for collusion
to be pro…table in games on the unit line, unit circle and unit square. Section 6 discusses Nash
equilibria for location games with collusion and Section 7 concludes.
1They can also be applied to parliamentary elections that are not winner-take-all contests.
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2 Setup and de…nitions
Let ¡(O;P ) be a location game on O µ Rk with set of players P . Let pi 2 P be player i with
i = 1; 2; :::; n. Each player pi chooses a location xi 2 O. Consumers are distributed over O via a
Lebesgue measurable density function f with total mass 1. Let d(o; o0) be the distance between two
points o; o0 2 O. Each consumer is assumed to buy one unit of an unspeci…ed good from the player
closest to her. That is, a consumer at o 2 O buys from player pi only if d(o; xi) = minj d(o; xj).
If there are more than one closest player then the consumer is assumed to buy from each closest
player with the same probability. The price of the good is …xed at 1 and production costs are
normalized to zero.
Let Oi(¡) =
©
o j d(o; xi) = minj d(o; xj)
ª
. Player pi’s market share and pro…t is then given
by ¼i(¡) = 1
ri
R
Oi f(o)do where r
i denotes the number of players located at xi. By assumption,P
i ¼
i = 1. By virtue of this fact, we say that a player’s expected payo¤ before the game is actually
played (“behind the veil of ignorance”) is 1n .
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Next we de…ne for integer m with 1 · m < n a set V (m) of reals with v 2 V (m) if there is
a collusion strategy for a set M µ P of m players that guarantees them a total payo¤ of at least
v. Let v(m) = supV (m).3
De…nition 1 Collusion of a set of m players is pro…table if v(m) > mn .
3 The one–dimensional case with uniform distributions
3.1 Linear cities
Let us …rst consider the standard textbook case of a “linear city” in which O = [0; 1] and in which
consumers are uniformly distributed. How can a set of m players guarantee itself a “high” payo¤?
Suppose m > n¡m, i.e., suppose that more than half of all …rms are in the set of colluding players.
In that case the colluding players can minimize the payo¤ obtainable to a …rm outside the coalition
by “evenly spreading out.” If f is uniform, the …rms in the set can guarantee themselves a payo¤
of 3m¡n2m by locating themselves at (k; 3k; 5k; :::; 1 ¡ k) with k = 12m . To see this, note that in this
case a …rm outside the set M is indi¤erent between all possible locations as each location yields a
payo¤ of 12m . Furthermore, the worst thing that can happen to the players in M is that the …rms
2For example, a player could expect that every assignment of players to equilibrium locations is equally likely.
3 In other words, v(m) is the maxmin payo¤ of the coalition.
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outside locate in di¤erent intervals, say, one between k and 3k, one between 3k and 5k and so on. If
they do, the players in M earn 1¡ n¡m2m = 3m¡n2m . And as this is larger than mn for m > n2 collusion
turns out to be pro…table. Thus m > n2 is su¢cient for collusion to be pro…table in linear cities
with a uniform distribution of consumers. That it is also necessary in this case is stated in
Proposition 1 In linear cities with a uniform distribution of consumers collusion pays if and only
if m > n2 .
Proof The argument above shows that m > n2 ) v(m) > mn . Next observe that, by de…nition,
v(m) + v(n¡m) · 1. (1)
Hence, m = n2 ) m = n¡m ) v(m) · 12 = mn , i.e., collusion is not pro…table if exactly half
of all …rms cooperate. The proof is completed by showing that collusion is also not pro…table
if m < n2 : If 1 · m < n2 , then n2 < n ¡ m · n ¡ 1 so that by the …rst part of the proof
v(n¡m) > n¡mn . Therefore, by (1) v(m) < 1¡ n¡mn = mn .¤
3.2 Circular cities
A further popular space to study location games on is a circle. In contrast to the line a set of m
colluding …rms can divide a circle into at most m arcs as opposed to m+ 1 segments on the line.
Nevertheless, one obtains the identical condition for collusion to be pro…table.
Proposition 2 In circular cities with a uniform distribution of consumers collusion pays if and
only if m > n2 .
Proof Position the colluding …rms such that there are m arcs with mass 1m each. If m ¸ n2 the
max i mum t ot al payo¤ t he n on –co l l u di ng …r ms ca n ob t ai n i s n¡m2m , i.e., by using this strategy
the colluding …rms can ensure a payo¤ of 3m¡n2m which is greater than
m
n if m >
n
2 . Using (1)
again completes the proof.¤
4 The multi–dimensional case
The following result is the main result of the paper. It generalizes one of the two insights gained
above, namely that collusion in location games can only be pro…table if more than half of all …rms
cooperate. This result holds for arbitrary bounded open subsets of Rk and for arbitrary bounded
atomless density functions.
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Theorem 1 Suppose consumers are distributed over a bounded open subset O µ Rk via a bounded
Lebesgue measurable density function f of total mass 1. For the n–player location game ¡(O;P ) it
is not pro…table for a set of m players to collude if m · n2 .
Proof Suppose the m colluding players p1; p2; :::; pm locate at x1; x2; :::; xm 2 O, not necessarily
distinct.
Case 1. n¡m ¸ 2m. Then for each i, 1 · i · m, let pm+2i¡1 and pm+2i locate at xm+2i¡1
and xm+2i, two points " units apart on a line through xi, with xi between xm+2i¡1 and
xm+2i and " chosen as follows: Let B be a k–dimensional ball containing O and let A be
the k ¡ 1–dimensional volume of the k ¡ 1–dimensional disk formed by intersecting B with
a hyperplane through its center. Choose " such that " < 1nA sup f and such that " is small
enough to guarantee x2m+i¡1; x2m+i 2 O for 1 · i · m. Let the rest of the non–colluding
players, p3m+1; p3m+2; :::; pn locate anywhere in O. Since the consumers won by pi, 1 · i · m,
lie between two hyperplanes " units apart, ¼i is at most "A sup f < 1n . Hence, v(m) <
m
n .
Case 2. m < n¡m < 2m. For 1 · i · m, de…ne the provisional market set Oiprov = Oi(¡0)
with ¡0 = ¡(O;M), i.e., Oiprov contains the points in O that are nearer to xi than to any other
xj 6= xi with both i; j · m. Accordingly, de…ne the provisional payo¤ ¼iprov = ¼i(¡0). W.l.o.g.
assume that the sequence ¼1prov; ¼
2
prov; :::; ¼
m
prov is non–decreasing. Now locate 3m¡ n of the
non–colluding players at x1; x2; :::; x3m¡n and use the remaining 2n ¡ 4m players to bracket
x3m¡n+1; x3m¡n+2; :::; xm as in case 1, but do net yet choose ". Notice that (i) 3m¡ n > 0;
(ii) 2n¡ 4m > 0; (iii) (3m¡n)+ (2n¡ 4m) = n¡m; and (iv) (3m¡n)+ (2n¡4m)=2 = m.
Since the sequence ¼1prov; ¼
2
prov; :::; ¼
m
prov is non–decreasing, the sum of the provisional payo¤s
¼1prov+¼
2
prov+ :::+¼
3m¡n
prov is at most
3m¡n
m . Therefore, the …nal total payo¤s to the colluding
players
Pm
i=1 ¼
i is at most 3m¡n2m + "(n¡ 2m)A sup f . Now notice that 3m¡n2m < mn . Hence, it
is possible to choose " such that mn ¡
Pm
i=1 ¼
i > 0. Collusion is not pro…table.
Case 3. m = n¡m. Nonpro…tability follows from (1) as in the proof of Proposition 1.¤
Thus, we know that collusion in location games (on bounded open subsets of Rk in which
consumers are distributed via atomless density functions) can only be pro…table if more than half
of all …rms join the set M.
Remark 1 Note that neither the closed interval [0; 1] nor a circle is an open subset of an Euclidean
space. However, the conclusion of the theorem holds for location games on these sets, since
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the techniques of the proof apply. More particularly, it is possible to bracket colluding players
as in the proofs. In fact, a colluding player at 0 or 1 in [0; 1] can be bracketed by a single
non–colluding player.
Remark 2 The theorem concerns location games de…ned using Euclidean distances, i.e., straight
line distances. Implicitly, this means that consumers may travel along routes that do not
belong to O. However, the theorem applies, for example, to a circle (or rather the conclusion
of the theorem holds—see Remark 1) even when the distance between two points is the length
of the arc joining them, since for a circle in R2 a consumer’s nearest player is the same whether
distance is de…ned as Euclidean distance or as arc length.
The theorem disallows atoms of consumers. The following example demonstrates the ne-
cessity of this assumption.
Example Consider the 5–player location game on [0; 1] with two consumers, one at 14 and one at
2
3 . Suppose p
1 and p2 collude by locating at 14 and
2
3 respectively. Their worst total payo¤
occurs when p3 and p4 locate at 14 and p
5 locates at 23 . The total payo¤ of p
1 and p2 is then
1
3 +
1
2 =
5
6 which is greater than the veil of ignorance expected payo¤ of 2(
2
5) =
4
5 . Collusion
is pro…table with m = 2 even though m < n2 . As in the proof of Proposition 1, where it is
shown that the complement of a pro…table set of colluding players is unpro…table, collusion
is unpro…table for m = 3, even though in that case m > n2 .¤
5 Su¢cient conditions for unit interval, unit circle, and unit square
The main theorem above showed that m > n2 is necessary for collusion to be successful. In the
following we will establish su¢cient conditions for collusion to be pro…table in a location game
played on the unit interval, the unit circle, and the unit square. Notice that in each case the
solution prescribes that the colluding players behave according to the above identi…ed strategies,
i.e., they will evenly spread out making other players indi¤erent between locations.
Proposition 3 In linear cities, collusion pays if sup finf f <
2m
n .
Remark 3 Note that sup f= inf f ¸ 1. Thus, the condition in Proposition 3 ensures thatm > n=2.
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Proof of Proposition 3 W.l.o.g. let x1 · x2 · ::: · xm be the set of locations occupied by the
colluding players chosen so thatZ x1
0
f(o)do =
1
2
Z x2
x1
f(o)do =
1
2
Z x3
x2
f(o)do = ::: =
Z 1
xm
f(o)do =
1
2m
:
If a non–colluding player locates to the left of x1 or to the right of xm, his payo¤ is at most
1
2m <
1
n . If a non–colluding player locates between x
i and xi+1, his payo¤ is
R d
c f(o)do where
xi < c < d < xi+1 and d¡ c = 12(xi+1 ¡ xi). ThenZ d
c
f(o)do · (d¡ c) sup f
=
xi+1 ¡ xi
2
inf f
µ
sup f
inf f
¶
· 1
2
Z xi+1
xi
f(o)do
µ
sup f
inf f
¶
<
1
2m
µ
2m
n
¶
=
1
n
.
If a non–colluding player locates at xi, 1 · i · m, then he shares the market set Oi with pi.
By the argument above, the portion of Oi to the left of xi has consumer mass less than 1n , as
does the portion of Oi to the right of xi. Therefore, the payo¤ to each non–colluding player
is less then ( 1n +
1
n)=2 =
1
n . Since in all these cases the payo¤ to a non–colluding player is
less than 1n ; the total payo¤ to the colluding players is more than 1¡ n¡mn = mn . Collusion is
pro…table.¤
The su¢cient condition in Proposition 3 is stronger than necessary. For instance, we used
as an assumption on f only that
supff(x):xi<x<xi+1g
infff(x):xi<x<xi+1g <
2m
n . This allows any amount of variation to
the left of x1 and to the right of xm and, if m is large, between x1 and xm.4
Proposition 4 In circular cities, collusion pays if m > n2 and
sup f
inf f <
2m
n .
Proof Analogous to the proofs of Propositions 2 and 3.¤
4Moreover, the …rms located at x1 and xm could move further into the interior as the mass on the fringes has
only to be smaller than 1n . Using this, one can increase the allowed variation between x
1 and xm from 2mn toh
2(m¡1)
n¡2
im¡1
> 2m
n . To see this, simply observe that the colluding players can position themselves so that the
remaining mass between x1 and xm, 1¡ 2n , is equally distributed over m¡ 1 intervals. The proof then goes through
with
supff(x):xi<x<xi+1g
infff(x):xi<x<xi+1g <
2(m¡1)
n¡2 . Therefore,
supff(x):x1<x<xmg
infff(x):x1<x<xmg can be as large as
h
2(m¡1)
n¡2
im¡1
.
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Finally, we look at location games played on the unit square with uniform consumer density.
Proposition 5 For the n–player location game on the square [0; 1] £ [0; 1] with consumers dis-
tributed uniformly, collusion is pro…table if there is a positive integer h with (2h+1)2 ¡ h2 · m <
n < (2h+ 1)2.
Proof Suppose m;n and h satisfy the hypotheses of the theorem. Consider the set C of points in
[0; 1]£ [0; 1] of the form
³
i¡1=2
2h+1 ;
j¡1=2
2h+1
´
where i and j are integers, 1 · i; j · 2h+1, and i and
j are not both even. There are exactly (2h + 1)2 ¡ h2 points in C. Locate the m colluding
players so that there is at least one of them at each point of C (recall thatm ¸ (2h+1)2¡h2).
In the course of proving that an in…nite square lattice is a Nash equilibrium for the location
game in the plane with consumers distributed uniformly, Knoblauch (2002) proved that in
the location game on [0; 1] £ [0; 1], any player with at least one opponent at each point of C
earns a payo¤ of at most 1
(2h+1)2
so that the non–colluding players’ total payo¤ is at most
n¡m
(2h+1)2
< n¡mn . Hence, v(m) >
m
n .¤
For large n, the proposition says, roughly, that collusion is pro…table if m > 3n4 . This
interpretation follows from the fact that for large n there is an integer h such that n < (2h+ 1)2,
(2h+1)2
n ¼ 1, and (2h+1)
2¡h2
n ¼ 34 . For example, if n = 1; 000; 000 choose h = 500. Then (2h +
1)2 = 1; 002; 001 and (2h + 1)2 ¡ h2 = 752; 001. The proposition says collusion is pro…table if
m
1;000;000 ¸ :752001.
6 Nash equilibria
It is natural to ask about the relationship between pro…tability as discussed above and Nash equilib-
rium. Consider, for instance, a location game on the unit interval [0; 1] with consumers distributed
uniformly, played by several independent …rms and one player who controls a set of …rms. Can
we …nd location strategies for the independent …rms so that these strategies together with the
pro…table collusion strategy identi…ed above comprise a Nash equilibrium?
It is possible to answer this question in some special cases and we shall do this below.
However, in general the problem is very di¢cult, perhaps intractable.
The di¢culty arises from two sources. The …rst thing one discovers when working on the
problem is that a Nash equilibrium requires mixed strategies for the independent …rms. Unfortu-
nately, due to the computational complexities, little is known about mixed strategy equilibria for
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location games on the unit interval. Shaked (1982) constructed a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
for three …rms locating on [0; 1], and there are nonconstructive existence theorems by Dasgupta
and Maskin (1986) and Simon (1987). Second, the di¢culty in …nding mixed strategy equilibria is
compounded when one player controls m locations, due to the added computational complexity.
Prospects are even bleaker for location games with collusion in dimensions 2 and higher.
Up to now, nothing has been published on location games in dimension 3 or above, and little on
solutions for location games in dimension 2. Shaked (1975) showed that there are no pure-strategy
Nash equilibria for a wide variety of 3-player location games in the plane; Okabe and Aoyagi (1993)
proved that an in…nite square array of …rms in the plane is a Nash equilibrium for a uniform
distribution of consumers, and Knoblauch (1997) catalogued all 3-player equilibria on the 2-sphere
when consumers are distributed uniformly.
In summary, the di¢culty of …nding mixed strategy equilibria for location games translates
into di¢culty for our problem–…nding equilibria for location games with collusion. It seems reason-
able that …rms that engage in games that game theorists are unable to solve should choose rather
conservatively when it comes to making big decisions such as decisions about colluding or merging
with others. We have therefore proposed pro…tability as a conservative criterion to be used by …rms
faced with collusion decisions or merger proposals.
Nevertheless, the following proposition answers the question posed at the beginning of this
section in the a¢rmative in the special case that the number of locations controlled by the “big”
player is an integral multiple of the number of independent …rms.
Proposition 6 Let G be a location game in which consumers are distributed uniformly on [0; 1]
with density 1, players 1; 2; : : : ; n¡m; are independent …rms, player n¡m+1 controls m locations
and m = a(n¡m) where a is a positive integer greater than 1. Let sn¡m+1 be player n¡m+ 1’s
strategy from Section 3.1, which picks locations at each element of the set fk; 3k; 5k; : : : ; 1¡kg, where
k = 1=2m. For i = 1; 2; : : : ; n¡m, let si be player i’s strategy that assigns probability 1a to each of
the a points (2ai¡2a+1)=2m, (2ai¡2a+3)=2m; : : : ; (2ai¡1)=2m.5 Then (s1; s2; : : : ; sn¡m; sn¡m+1)
5To illustrate, consider the case in which there is only one independent player (i.e., m = a = n-1). In this case
the independent player chooses each of the m equidistant locations chosen by the …rm controlling the coalition with
probabilty 1/m. Alternatively, consider the special case of n = 6 and m = 4 (a=2), i.e. there are two independent
players and one player controlling a 4-…rm coalition. In this case the coalition …rms will occupy locations 1/8, 3/8, 5/8,
and 7/8 whereas the …rst (second) independent player chooses locations 1/8 and 3/8 (5/8 and 7/8) with probability
1/2 each.
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is a Nash equilibrium of G.
Proof Fix i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; n¡ mg. Let H be a game like G but with only two players, so that 1 is
an independent …rm and 2 controls m locations. For x 2 [0; 1],
¼Gi (s1; : : : ; si¡1; x; si+1; : : : ; sn¡m+1) · ¼H1 (x; sn¡m+1) · 1=2m = ¼Gi (s1; s2; : : : ; sn¡m+1):
It remains to show that player n ¡ m + 1 can’t improve his payo¤ by a unilateral strategy
change.
Let tn¡m+1 be any pure strategy of player n¡m+ 1. Let K be a game like G but with two
players each of whom controls m locations. Then by the de…nitions of si,
n¡mX
i=1
¼Gi (s1; s2; : : : ; sn¡m; tn¡m+1)
= (
1
a
)
n¡mX
i=1
aX
j=1
¼Gi (s1; : : : ; si¡1; (2ai¡ 2a+ 2j ¡ 1)=2m;si+1; : : : ; sn¡m; tn¡m+1)
¸ ¼K1 (sn¡m+1; tn¡m+1)=a:
The inequality follows from the fact that any consumer (or fraction of a consumer) awarded
to the …rst player in game K will contribute to one of the summands on the left side of the
inequality. For example, suppose tn¡m+1 assigns three locations to k, two locations to 5k+ 12
and no location to any point between. How does the consumer interval (2k; 3k) contribute to
the two sides of the inequality? Player 1 in game K wins all of (2k; 3k). Player 1 in game G
wins all of (2k; 3k) in the summand ¼Gi (3k; s2; : : : ; sn¡m; tn¡m+1) and one quarter of (2k; 3k)
in the summand ¼Gi (k; s2; : : : ; sn¡m; tn¡m+1).
Next ¼K1 (sn¡m+1; tn¡m+1) ¸ (3m ¡ n)=2m = 1=2 by the pro…tability argument in Section
3.1. Combining the above inequalities,
n¡mX
i=1
¼Gi (s1; s2; : : : ; sn¡m; tn¡m+1) ¸ 1=2a = (n¡m)=2m
Therefore ¼Gn¡m+1(s1; s2; : : : ; sn¡m; tn¡m+1) · 1¡ (n¡m)=2m = (3m¡ n)=2m ·
¼Gn¡m+1(s1; s2; : : : ; sn¡m; sn¡m+1) with the last inequality following again from the pro…tabil-
ity argument of Section 3.1. ¤
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7 Discussion
We …nd that collusion in location games only pays if the set of colluders is larger than the set
of non–colluding competitors. Bilateral collusion, for example, can only pay if there are no more
than three competitors. This result is based on an approach which relies on rather weak rationality
requirements. It assumes that players discussing some binding agreements to collude will only go
ahead if they can guarantee themselves a payo¤ better than the payo¤ expected “behind the veil
of ignorance”.
This maxmin approach prescribes that colluding players should spread themselves out,
making players outside the colluding set indi¤erent between locations. This seems to be rather
intuitive: One would expect that two colluding supermarkets (or supermarkets belonging to the
same chain) locate in di¤erent parts of one city to avoid cannibalization. For a special case of
competition on the unit interval, we show that the maxmin strategy is also used in a non-cooperative
equilibrium.
Our results may have implications for the topic of mergers in markets with (pure) spatial
competition as an example of which competition among big book retailers (where price competition
is extremely limited) may serve. As merger in the traditional sense (see Salant, Switzer, and
Reynolds 1983) where …rms simply “disappear” never pays in such location games, merger can
only be pro…table if the merging units are kept as separate units which are governed by central
headquarters. This is identical to the case of collusion analysed above. However, the analysis
reveals that with this kind of competition only “mega mergers” are likely to occur.6
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